I. Introduction
This paper studies the firstjob choice and subsequent labor mobility of law school graduates. The model assumes that these individuals behave as though they were solving a finite-horizon, discrete-choice dynamic programming problem under uncertainty. The structural face high future promotion probabilities in the private law firm sectors. As soon as private law firm job offers arrive, high-ability attorneys enter these sectors, in which they have higher expected future earnings. Low-ability attorneys, in contrast, face low probabilities of future promotion, or high probabilities of dismissal, and hence exit the private law firm sectors after a short time. For these latter attorneys, private law firms serve as vehicles to high-paying jobs in other sectors of the market. This self-selection mechanism also has implications for policy interventions in the market for lawyers. To illustrate this, a loan forgiveness program is simulated and shown to have a sustained impact on the supply decisions of only low-ability attorneys. The structural parameters of the model, which are used to assess model fit and simulate the policy intervention, are recovered by repeatedly solving the dynamic optimization problem and maximizing a likelihood function that reflects choices and wages observed for each attorney over a 15-year period since graduation. For the years in which wages are reported, only the wages in the chosen sectors are known. The solution of the dynamic program serves to correct the accepted wages so that wage function estimates represent wages offered by firms. The model is shown to fit the observed data quite well in several dimensions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data. Section III presents the behavioral model. Section IV contains the estimation results and an evaluation of model fit. In Section V, the implications of the model are discussed in terms of the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in abilities and the effect of a loan forgiveness program. Section VI presents conclusions. The Appendix outlines the solution and estimation method.
II. Data
The University of Michigan Law School has been collecting data from surveying all alumni since 1952. This paper uses data from the surveys sent both 5 and 15 years after graduation to the classes of 1972-75. These classes contain a total of 1,691 individuals, 1,043 (61.7 percent) of whom answered the 15-year survey.' The largest subgroup of respondents is 888 white males, and only this subgroup 1 Emphasis is placed on the 15-year surveys since the 5-year surveys are a less comprehensive source of longitudinal information. Prior to 1972, 15-year surveys were lacking in important details, and the 15-year survey of the class of 1975 was the last available at the time this study began. Wood, Corcoran, and Courant (1993) also used these class years.
is used in estimation.2 Reasonably accurate 15-year employment histories could be constructed for 693 of these respondents.
Assignments to the different employment sectors in years 1, 5, and 15 after graduation were made first as follows. Sole proprietors were placed in the solo sector. An attorney employed in a Fortune 500 company, bank or other financial institution, accounting firm, insurance firm, other business organization, or other service organization was placed in the business sector.3 An attorney employed in federal government, state or local government, legal services, public interest, or an educational institution was placed in the nonprofit sector.4 If an attorney was employed in a private law firm, then a cutoff firm size determined assignment to the nonelite (small private law firm) or elite (large private law firm) sector. In order to account for differential growth in private law firms, the cutoff number of attorneys was allowed to vary over time and geographical location. In year 15, a firm outside of New York with fewer (more) than 100 attorneys and a firm inside New York with fewer (more) than 200 attorneys was considered nonelite (elite). In years 5 and 1, the nonelite/elite cutoffs were 50 and 35, respectively, regardless of location.5 Private law firm attorneys could also be classified as associates or partners in years 5 and 15.
Completion of the longitudinal record was straightforward for an attorney who reported, on the 15-year survey, one or two jobs held since graduation and the number of years on the current job. If more than two jobs were reported, then the reported number of years spent in government and number of years spent in private practice were generally needed. Table 1 shows the sectoral choice distribution (actual) over the first 15 years since graduation from law school. Several trends are evident. Only 10 percent of the sample chose first jobs in either 2 83 white female respondents, the next largest subgroup, were not included in the model since a substantial proportion chose home production or part-time work after graduation. Only 10 white males chose these options at some point in their careers. 3In year 15, 40.7 percent of business attorneys worked in Fortune 500 companies and 35.1 percent of business attorneys were no longer practicing law. These latter attorneys were included in the sample following the assumption that a law degree was an essential part of their marketability. 4In year 15, 78.5 percent of nonprofit attorneys were employed in federal government, state or local government, or legal services; 17.7 percent were employed in education.
5The year 5 and 1 cutoffs were selected after examining firm growth rates in the subsample of attorneys who had only one job and were classified as either nonelite or elite according to the 15-year cutoff. Similar cutoffs were used by Kornhauser and Revesz (1995) . Similar firm growth rates over this period are reported in Galanter and Palay (1991). the solo or business sector, but the proportion steadily grows over time to 25 percent. The nonprofit sector contains 18 percent of new graduates, with the proportion steadily declining to 11 percent.6 The nonelite and elite sectors in year 1 contain 72 percent of the sample. The combined proportion subsequently declines to 65 percent, whereas the proportion in the nonelite sector slightly increases. Table 2 presents the transition matrix (actual), which aggregates sectoral transitions.7 The figures indicate a high degree of persistence in all sectors but the nonprofit sector. The most common destination of exiting nonprofit attorneys is the nonelite sector, and transitions into the elite sector most likely originate from the nonprofit sector.
Figures 1-3 display sector-specific hazard functions (actual), which are nonparametric estimates of the probability that an attor-6 higher proportion of firstjob entrants in the nonprofit sector as well as the declining proportion over time is not due to temporary judicial clerkships. In year 1 after graduation, clerks were assigned to their first job sector after completing their clerkship. Less than 10 percent of the sample obtained clerkships, and over 80 percent joined private law firms on their completion. So as not to contaminate sector-specific wage offer functions, the reported salaries of clerks are ignored (Wood et al. 1993 ney exits his first employment sector at time t conditional on not having left the sector at time t -18 Each hazard function rises to a global peak in the early years after graduation and declines thereafter. The nonprofit and nonelite sector hazard functions peak after 3 years of sectoral tenure. The elite sector hazard function peaks after 4 years.9 Table 3 The previous-period choice variables, dk(t -1), k E K, appear in (2) because last period's choice is assumed to affect opportunities in the current period. For example, an attorney who chose the business sector last period faces a different probability of a current elite offer than if he chose the nonprofit sector.'5 The variable A distinguishes, by ability level, two types of attorneys. It is zero if the attorney is type 1 (low-ability) and one if the attorney is type 2 (high-ability). Attorney type is assumed to be common knowledge. The stochastic elements of the state space, Ekt, k E K, are allowed to be contemporaneously correlated but for simplicity are assumed to be mutually serially independent.
The constraints of the optimization problem lie in the offer probability structure. Let Pok denote the probability of receiving an offer to work in position k immediately on graduation. The vector of first job offer probabilities is assumed to be P(1) = {1, P02, P03, P04, P05, 0, 0}. (5) That is, graduates can become sole proprietors with certainty, cannot enter the labor market as partners, and face stochastic probabilities of offers in the other positions.
The on-the-job offer probabilities Pjk, j, k E K, are the probabilities of receiving an offer in position k, at the beginning of time t, conditional on having worked in position j in period t -1. The Pjk'S form a 7 X 7 offer probability matrix specified as for 2 -t ? T. Column 1 assumes that an attorney can always become a sole proprietor regardless of prior-period position. The zeros in columns 5 and 6 imply that an attorney must spend the prior period as an associate before facing a nonzero partnership probability. Nonelite partners (row 6) receive offers with certainty in all positions but elite associate and elite partner. Elite partners (row 7) receive offers with certainty in all positions but nonelite partner. Solo, business, and nonprofit attorneys, like partners, can always continue in their respective positions.16 All offer probabilities except for the associate continuation proba- 
The appearance of attorney type in the offer probabilities and not in the wage offer functions or the benefit terms suggests that type is related to an ability characteristic such as capacity to learn on the job (Rosen 1972 An up-or-out employment structure in the nonelite and elite sectors is modeled in the following way. Let the event of coming up for review at the beginning of year t be denoted as R(t), with R(t) = 1 if the associate comes up for review and R( t) = 0 otherwise. A neces- 16 The restrictions on the offer probability matrix, while empirically motivated, help to simplify the expressions for expected future returns. A further but less general assumption could have been introduced that specifies an offer probability of one in the nonelite sector if an offer is received in the elite sector.
17 Indeed, including attorney type in these latter functions does not yield significant results. Attorney type, therefore, affects returns solely through the opportunity to receive a fixed wage. No evidence is found that different attorney types differentially value sector-specific benefits. 18 The assumption that the fifth year is the first period in which an elite associate can be considered for partner is consistent with evidence in Abel (1989) and Galanter and Palay (1991) . The assumption that a nonelite associate can be considered earlier (the fourth year) is consistent with evidence in Spurr (1987) . In principle, Tk could be estimated but is not since it is integer valued. sary condition for R(t) 1 is t 2 tk. The probability that R(t) = 1 is denoted as PA4 in the nonelite sector and PG5 in the elite sector.
The associate continuation probabilities are therefore t o when R(t) =1 1 otherwise for k = 4, 5. That is, the associate either will not come up for review, in which case remaining an associate is always an option, or will come up for review and will either be offered partnership or be dismissed from the sector."9 The partnership probability in the nonelite sector is also conditional on coming up for review and is specified as Previous employment sector and time since graduation also affect arrival rates. This can be explained by the general and specific training attorneys receive (Leibowitz and Tollison 1978) . General training in the first few years after graduation is presumably useful in all positions but may vary in quality depending on employment sector. After the first few years, training becomes more sector-specific. The higher on-the-job offer probabilities that nonprofit, nonelite, and elite attorneys face, regardless of type and time, may reflect higherquality general and more transferable specific training. The quality of general training appears to be highest in the elite sector. The positive impact of time in the nonprofit sector suggests that specific training in this sector is highly transferable.21
IV. Estimation Results

A. Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates for the partnership probabilities show that being a type 2 attorney has a dramatic effect. The nonelite partnership probability, for an associate with no cross experience, is .037 if type 1 and .896 if type 2. The elite partnership probability, for an associate with no cross experience, is .023 if type 1 and .764 if type 2. O'Flaherty and Siow (1995) similarly estimate the partnership probability for a high-ability-type, large-firm associate to be .746. Partnership probabilities are higher for both types in the nonelite sector, and cross experience has a positive impact in both sectors.22 These latter two results are consistent with previous findings in Spurr (1987) . The positive effect of cross experience on the elite partner-21 High-ability attorneys who do not receive offers in private law firms immediately after graduation generally prefer the nonprofit sector over the business sector, even though the business sector offers higher current-period wages. This result is due to higher arrival rates for offers from private law firms in the nonprofit sector. ship probability probably reflects the importance of litigation skills acquired in the nonprofit sector. Table 5 presents the estimated parameters of the wage offer functions along with their standard errors, the estimated standard deviations of technology shocks, and the estimated dollar values of the benefit terms.23 The estimates show that experience in the elite sector always has a lower return for sole proprietors, suggesting that the general and specific training acquired in the elite sector is not particularly valuable in this position. Experience in the elite sector, however, always has a higher return in the business sector. This result is not surprising given that the clients of elite private law firms are mostly large businesses. In the nonprofit sector, the first 6 years of elite experience have a higher return, but the return falls off rapidly. Too much specific training in the elite sector thus penalizes earnings. In the nonelite associate position, elite experience has a higher return after 5 years have been accumulated. Thus only specific training is advantageous. Elite experience always has a lower return for nonelite partners and a higher return for elite associates and elite partners.24
The estimated benefit terms vary greatly by position. All estimates are relative to the nonprofit sector for identification and indicate that benefits in this sector have the highest market value. The most negative estimates are in the business and elite sectors. The importance of factors such as retirement contributions, work hours, and work environment in determining these values cannot be assessed given the limitations of the data.
B. Model Fit
As shown in tables 1 and 2 and figures 1-3, there are no statistically significant differences between actual and predicted choice distributions, actual and predicted transition matrices, and actual and predicted hazard functions.25 Table 3 shows predicted mean accepted 23Joint estimation of choices and wages corrects the wage function parameter estimates for selectivity bias. The wage function parameters are adjusted for unobserved heterogeneity through the effect on future job offer probabilities and hence current choices. 24 Returns to experience outside of the elite sector are restricted to be the same in the elite associate and partner positions because of a singularity in the data. The contemporaneous correlation between associate and partner shocks is .213 in the nonelite sector and .258 in the elite sector. All other correlations either were not significantly different from zero or were restricted to be zero. 25 The At the beginning of the fifth year, many type 1 associates who do not receive offers in previous periods are dismissed, generating the hazard function peak. The hazard rates subsequently decline since the sector contains a greater proportion of type 2 attorneys who have monotonically decreasing hazard rates beginning in year 5. The fall in the hazard rates is driven by the up-or-out mechanism and the result that type 2 attorneys prefer the elite sector throughout the horizon.
The reason for the rise and subsequent fall in the nonelite sector hazard rates is quite similar.26 The nonprofit hazard rates, however, do not steadily rise before the peak since V3 fails to fall in relative value over time because of the absence of a dismissal threat. The global peak in the hazard function occurs when the probability that type 2 attorneys receive offers in the private law firm sectors increases. The second peak occurs as type 1 attorneys begin to exit for the solo sector.
Given the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in explaining the career choices of attorneys, it would be instructive to determine the relationship between background characteristics and attorney type. With Bayes's rule, the probability that an attorney is type 2 conditional on observed choices (d), accepted wages (w), and estimated parameters (0) can be expressed as tional probability of being a type 2 attorney.27 The conditional probability of being a type 1 attorney is simply 1 -Pr (A = 1 Id, w, 0). Forming the log odds of these posterior probabilities for each attorney and regressing them on a selected set of observable attorney characteristics yields the results in table 7.28 The estimates show that, ceteris paribus, an increase in an attorney's undergraduate grade point average increases the log odds the attorney is type 2 at a decreasing rate. Having been a moot court participant, having graduated in the top 25 percent of the class, and having an attorney parent all increase the log odds. These findings are consistent with the high-ability interpretation for type 2 attorneys. The achievement of a graduate degree prior to entering law school has a negative impact. This result could arise if those who switched fields are lemons. That is, a switch occurred because of a perceived limited chance of success in the original field. There is little correlation between attorney type and graduating class or the presence of educational debt.29
B. Loan Forgiveness
The estimated parameters of the model can be used to analyze loan forgiveness programs in terms of their effect on attorney supply deci-27 Probability it = .73. This high estimate of the unconditional probability of being a type 2 attorney is probably due to the elite status of the University of Michigan Law School. The standard error of the estimated intercept term in the logistic function is .234. 28 The standard errors have not been adjusted for the fact that the dependent variable in the regression has been estimated. 29 There is also no correlation if a high debt indicator replaces the indicator of nonzero debt. sions. As an illustration, yearly debt payments are subtracted from the benefit terms in all positions but the nonprofit position for the first 15 years after graduation. Table 8 shows that this produces a 1.1 percent increase in the number of attorneys choosing the nonprofit sector immediately after graduation. The increased proportion, however, is due almost entirely to additional type 1 entrants. Type 2 attorneys continue to enter the sector only if offers in private law firms are not received and exit as soon as these offers arrive, despite the increased return to nonprofit sector employment. By year 15, there are 2.7 percent more attorneys in the nonprofit sector since fewer type 1 attorneys exit for the solo sector.30
VI. Conclusion
In this paper a dynamic structural model of the career choices of attorneys was estimated using unique data on several cohorts of graduates from the University of Michigan Law School. The theoretical framework integrates and expands previous work by Weisbrod (1983) are found to be differentiated by pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns, promotion and dismissal probabilities, and the extent of transferability of human capital.
The estimation results show, in particular, that while partnership probabilities in the elite (large private law firm) sector are lower than in the nonelite (small private law firm) sector, elite experience has investment value in alternative sectors of the market. Elite associates face both higher job offer probabilities and higher alternative wage offers depending on the number of years of experience accumulated and the sector to which the experience is transferred. The nonprofit sector, in comparison to the business and solo sectors, offers lower wages but higher nonpecuniary benefits and higher probabilities of receiving job offers in private law firms. The disaggregation of the choice set is important in uncovering these effects. Self-selection among the five sectors, based on unobserved ability type and expected future returns, is also shown to be a critical element in generating the sector-specific nonmonotonic separation hazards observed in the data. The self-selection mechanism has implications for policy interventions in the market for lawyers, such as loan forgiveness programs.
Several extensions of the model would be desirable. First, learning about attorney ability type, as in O'Flaherty and Siow (1995), could be introduced. This would help distinguish, in one model, the relative contributions of learning and unobserved heterogeneity in producing nonmonotonic hazard functions. Second, incorporating a theory of law firm decision making, as in Ferrall (1990) or Rebitzer and Taylor (1995), would help better specify the determinants ofjob offer and promotion probabilities. Third, including data on female attorneys (Wood et al. 1993 ; Biddle and Hamermesh 1996) might reveal gender differences in both job and wage offers while holding ability constant. Finally, this type of model can be easily modified to explain the career choices in other labor markets that are characterized by specialty sectors with different institutional arrangements.
Appendix
The standard solution method for finite-horizon dynamic programs is backward recursion. To outline the solution method, denote a particular set of values for the deterministic components of the state space at time t as S(t), and consider an attorney entering the last decision period, t = T, with S(T). Given a draw from the assumed multivariate normal distribution of technology shocks, the seven terminal value functions can be calculated. Consider now an attorney in period T -1 with S(T -1). To compute the 
